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Abstract
We use the dynamic production function identities and an empirical
model of oil prices based only on oil extraction data to analyze the dynam-
ics of oil prices as we transition into the contraction phase of oil extraction.
We explore the implications with respect to several common scenarios.
1 Introduction
This paper is an attempt to understand the economic dynamics of peak oil
extraction, or more generally peak resource extraction. We use economic pro-
duction function theory and empirical data to analyze the price dynamics of oil
extraction.
There is considerable variation in estimates of future oil extraction with-
out climate mitigation policies in place. On the low side are the Association
for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) and Uppsala Global Energy Sys-
tems (UGES). Total and the International Energy Agency (IEA) give somewhat
higher estimates. Exxon, BP and the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
give high estimates. The International Institute for Applied System Analysis
(IIASA) on which the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) basis its
climate change scenarios gives relatively high estimates. Hotelling’s rule has a
very poor record predicting both future extraction and future prices [11]. Other
models used to predict future oil extraction such as Hubbert linearization have
been criticized because they do not take prices into account. In fact the quan-
tity of oil reserves is very much a function of price [9], the higher the price the
larger the reserves because high prices permit the use of expensive extraction
technologies to recover more oil. In [39] the authors give three scenarios for
China’s future oil extraction rate and Ultimate Recoverable Resource (URR)
based on three different price scenarios. Thus a robust model predicting future
prices would be a valuable asset to those predicting future extraction which is
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important for economic reasons and for concerns about greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Viewing previous price estimates of the EIA [33] one sees that they lack
a robust price predicting model as any volatility in prices leads to very poor
price estimates.
Many empirical studies [10, 28, 24, 13, 29, 2, 18, 12] show that food and
energy are key quantities to consider when evaluating economic production. The
“Cost Share Theorem” from neoclassic equilibrium theory [2, Appendix A] says
that cost share is proportional to the elasticity or scaling factors of the variables
in the production function equation. Because the cost share of labor is almost
10 times the cost share of energy in the economy, many economists discount
the idea that energy is important for economic production. In Section 2, we
prove the dynamic production function identities, (2.8) and (2.9), which we
then use to show that cost share dynamics are a more robust indication of the
importance of a quantity in an economy rather than its size (because fewer
assumptions are required). In particular important items have either slowly
increasing or decreasing cost shares in a growing economy and decreasining
cost shares in a contracting economy. We differ from other works on economic
production functions such as [32, 2, 18] in that we make very few assumptions on
the structure of the economy or the nature of the economic production function.
We assume only some regularity of the production function to obtain our results.
Our results are thus much more general and can be applied to a larger set of
economies, both past and present.
We present an empirical model for the price of oil at year t as a function of
extraction at year t, year t−1, and year t−2. We hope that understanding this
model will enable better future price prediction aiding those predicting future
oil extraction.
We find that the price of oil during the contraction phase of oil extrac-
tion will be high but decreasing as extraction rates decrease creating negative
feedback loops accelerating the contraction because of contraction of economic
production. Higher price extraction will be unprofitable reducing extraction
rates which will result in lower prices resulting in less extraction, etc. During
the expansion phase of oil extraction, high prices increased the extraction rate
and low prices increased the market for oil. During the contraction phase, our
data suggests that high prices will decrease the market for oil and low prices
will decrease the extraction rate.
2 Economic Production Function Theory
Economic production functions not only indicate what macro economic quan-
tities one should measure to detect motors of economic growth, but give in-
dications of the dynamics of the economy when production of these economic
motors peaks and goes into decline.
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2.1 Definitions and Hypotheses
Let Y (t) be a measure of economic production expressed in currency where t de-
notes time. We make no assumptions about the structure of the economy other
than the existence of a well developed monetary system to determine the dis-
tribution of wealth. Let q(t) ∈ Rd be the measurable quantities in the economy
(quantities with a price). We will make use of the following assumptions:
(H1)
Y (t) = Y (q(t), t) (2.1)
is a locally C1(Rd ×R 7→ R) with q(t) = (q1(t), . . . qd(t)) ∈ Rd. Prices are
locally C1(Rd × R 7→ R) functions of quantities.
(H2) Over short periods of time the economic production function depends
more on q(t) than on the time variable, therefore, for short periods of
time Y (q(t), t) ≈ Y (q(t)), q(t) ∈ Rd.
(H3) For short periods of time we have
∂Y
∂qi
6= 0 for i = 1, . . . , d.
Remark 2.1. 1. The regularity assumptions are not essential to the theory
developed below, their purpose is to simplify notation.
2. In the real world, d = d(t). Care must be taken when applying results to
new quantities or disappearing quantities.
Assumption (H1) is not a strong assumption, as the very fact that GDP is
measurable, means we measure certain quantities and use prices to evaluate the
value added by the domestic economy.
Assumption (H2) essentially says that we assume it takes time for the econ-
omy to change. Certain quantities are fungible, but we assume it takes a certain
amount of time to switch from one item to the other.
Assumption (H3) is not a strong assumption, as we are eliminating only
quantities that have a small effect on the economy at any given time.
Because the units of Y (t) are in currency, an equivalent formulation can be
to consider Y (p(t)) where p(t) ∈ Rd is the vector of prices of q(t). We use this
formulation in (2.9).
Let pi(t) be the cost per unit of qi(t) and let Ci(t) be the cost share or
intensity of qi in the economy,
Ci(t)
def
= pi(t)qi(t)/Y (t). (2.2)
We will denote by Yi(t, u) = Yi(qi(t), u), with qi(t) ∈ Rd−1, consisting of qj ,
j 6= i, the quantity
Yi(t, u)
def
=
∫ u
0
∂Y (qi(t), qi(s))
∂qi
q′i(s)ds (2.3)
3
where we make the technical assumption that Yi(qi(t), qi(0)) = 0 for all i ∈ J1, dK
and all t ∈ R+. We define the functions p˜i(t, u) and C˜i(t, u) similarly. We define
the index
IYi(t1, t2) = IYi(t, t1, t2)
= Yi(t, t2)/Yi(t, t1). (2.4)
We do not indicate the dependance on t in the index and will always assume
that t ∈ [t1, t2]. We define the indices IC˜i(t1, t2) and Ip˜i(t1, t2) similarly.
Elasticity, or how quantities scale in the economic production function is
very important. Suppose d = 1. One can write Y (t) = Cqα(t). If α(t) ≡ α,
a constant, then the production function is homogeneous of degree α and we
call α the elasticity or scaling factor. If α = 1 Y is linear in q, if α < 1, Y is
sublinear in q, otherwise, Y is superlinear in q. Scaling factors are important
in many sciences and mathematics. One looks for constant or average scaling
empirically by normalizing quantities at a start date, taking logs and performing
linear regression.
2.2 Main Results
Theorem 2.1. Assume (H1), then
1. If αi(t) is the scaling factor of qi in Y , then αi(t)− 1 is the scaling factor
of pi/Ci.
2. Assume that Ci is constant. Then sublinear scaling of Y in qi occurs if
and only if pi(qi) is monotone decreasing, linear scaling implies price is
independent of qi, and superlinear scaling occurs if and only if pi(qi) is
monotone increasing.
3. The greater
∂Y
∂qi
, the smaller the scarcity rent in the in the sense of (2.7)
(see discussion below).
4. The index of Yi(u) for any (t1, t2) ∈ R2+x is given by
IYi(t1, t2) = Ip˜i(t1, t2)IC˜i(t2, t1)Iqi(t1, t2). (2.5)
Proof. From (2.2) one immediately obtains
pi(t) = Ci(t)Y (t)/qi(t). (2.6)
Properties (1) and (2) can be read directly from (2.6).
Taking the derivative of (2.6) one obtains the dynamic price identity:
∂pi
∂qi
=
∂Ci
∂qi
Y
qi
+ Ci
∂Y
∂qi
qi − Y
q2
. (2.7)
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The scarcity rent of a quantity varies inversely to its importance in the economic
production function in the following sense. The more important a quantity in
the economic production function, the greater the partial derivative of Y with
respect to that quantity. But from (2.7), we see that the price is an increasing
function of the partial derivative of Y with respect to q, or price decreases as
quantity decreases, a negative scarcity . This proves (3). (Of course, for an
important quantity one would expect the derivative of the cost share to be
strongly negative and dominate the positive term.)
Solving (2.2) for Y , taking the log and then the derivative with respect to
qi, one obtains the first dynamic production function identity:
∂Y
∂qi
= Y

∂pi
∂qi
pi
−
∂Ci
∂qi
Ci
+
1
qi
 . (2.8)
Taking the derivative with respect to prices, we obtain the second dynamic
production function identity:
∂Y
∂pi
= Y

∂qi
∂pi
qi
−
∂Ci
∂pi
Ci
+
1
pi
 . (2.9)
The sign of the left hand side of (2.8) is the same as the sign in parentheses
on the right hand side. To obtain (2.5), we multiply (2.8) by dqdt /Y and integrate
from t1 to t2 and take the exponential of the resulting equation.
Remark 2.2. 1. The main point of equations (2.5), (2.9), and (2.8) is that
Yi(u) is impossible to measure directly because one cannot vary just one
quantity in the economy, during periods of growth or contraction many
quantities vary simultaneously. In some cases we can draw conclusions on
Ip˜i and IC˜i from measurements of Ipi and ICi . See Section 4.1.
2. Equation (2.7) should not be considered a precise model because different
quantities in the equation move at different speeds. Prices move more
quickly than does the reaction of the economy to price changes. It makes
more sense to use (2.7) with annual data using the average yearly prices
than with spot prices.
3. Equation (2.7) is not in general an accurate way to measure
∂Y
∂qi
because
the term in parentheses can be the difference between two small numbers
of similar magnitude and hence numerically unstable. Equation (2.5) does
provide a method for measuring the contribution of a quantity in IY (t1, t2)
in cases where
C˜i(t) ≈ Ci(t) and (2.10)
p˜i(t) ≈ pi(t) (2.11)
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since IY (t1, t2) = IYuΠ
d
j=1IYj (t1, t2). because of the simultaneous growth
of other independent quantities. These equations tell us that in times of
economic growth, the cost share of economic motors should either stagnate
or decrease and that the cost per unit should increase. In times of economic
contraction, the opposite dynamic can be deduced. Economic drags on the
economy have the opposite dynamic.
4. The variable useful work, U
def
= eE, where e is efficiency and E is primary
energy (or more properly exergy) production was introduced by Ayres and
Warr [3] we can write Y (U(t), q¯) = Y (e(t)E(t), q¯) where q¯ ∈ Rd−1 are the
remaining quantities. Then (2.6) becomes pE = CEY (eE, q¯)/qE. Assum-
ing Y to be an increasing function of U , one sees that energy efficiency
increases the price per unit of energy assuming CE(t) remains constant.
We thus have a very simple explanation of the empirically observed Jevons
paradox or the rebound effect [15, 4]. Efficiency can be used to lower prices
if it is used to decrease cost share. See discussion in Section 4.1.
2.3 Representative Variables and the Implicit Function
Theorem
One might be interested in using standard techniques to determine the nature of
Y (t). If one accepts assumptions (H2) and (H3), one can use the implicit func-
tion theorem to reduce the number of variables to a small set of representative
variables locally. This is very familiar to investors who use economic indicators
to gauge the state of the economy. One can judge the quality of the indica-
tor variables by seeing how closely the empirical scaling factors of the variables
compare to the general scaling factors of the prices computed from pi/Ci. By
choosing overlapping time periods, empirical results will show whether or not
the computed functions can be stitched together for longer periods of time.
2.4 The Cost Share Theorem
Many empirical studies [10, 28, 24, 13, 29, 2, 18, 12, 14] show that food and
energy are key quantities to consider when evaluating economic production.
The “Cost Share Theorem” from neoclassic equilibrium theory [2, Appendix
A] says that for an economy in equilibrium, cost share is proportional to the
elasticity or scaling factors of the variables in the production function equation.
Because the cost share of labor is almost 10 times the cost share of energy
in the economy, many economists discount the idea that energy is important
for economic production. Theorem 2.1 shows that the cost share theorem is
extremely speculative in either a growing or shrinking economy. We make the
following remarks relative to the cost share theorem and Theorem 2.1:
Remark 2.3. 1. Theorem 2.1 shows that in a growing or shrinking econ-
omy, the dynamics of the cost share is the important consideration, not
the size. For important quantities, the derivative of the cost share is small
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or negative, that is, in a growing economy the cost share of important
quantities decreases or remains constant while the cost share of unimpor-
tant quantities increases. This makes sense. Important quantities such as
oil permit the growth of less important parts of the economy such as art
or competitive sports.
2. Equilibrium theory studies steady states. The economy is dynamic. A
dynamical system might converge to a steady state but one does not expect
a dynamical system to be in a steady state while it is changing. We feel
that a dynamical system approach to modeling the economy would be more
useful as in [22, 23, 5].
3. In the above cited articles empirical evidence did not support the Cost
Share Theorem. Rather than question the hypotheses on which the theorem
is based, the authors attempted to save equilibrium theory by introducing
constraints (thus introducing a Lagrange multiplier to explain the impor-
tance of energy in the economy). We do not use neoclassic equilibrium
theory.
There is a high probability that the hypotheses on which The Cost Share
Theorem is based are not verified. The Cost Share Theorem says that a large
cost share corresponds to importance in the economic production function. The-
orem 2.1 says that increasing cost share is a sign of unimportance in economic
production, however a large cost share frequently translates into political power.
This dynamic can induce governments to embrace counter productive policies as
during the stagflation period (see Section 3.1), the government might support
large sectors of the economy which are unimportant in economic production
rather than important areas of the economy with smaller cost shares.
In our view, a small cost share is not a sign of unimportance, in the case of
energy production, it is a sign of what might be called ecodiversity.
2.5 An Example
We suppose a very limited economy produces 3 quantities: E, G, and F . We
assume prices are adjusted for inflation for the 3 quantities and we normalize
all prices to one. The size of this economy is Y (t) =
∑3
i=1 piqi = E + G + F .
Now suppose that E is a motor of economic growth in the following sense, when
E grows 10% this produces a growth of 5% in both G and F in the next time
period. Growth in G has no effect on E or F . However F is a drag on economic
growth since a 10% growth in F causes a 5% percent contraction in E and G.
We can name our quantities to make the example more realistic. We call E
energy production, which permits us to produce more of G and F . Let us call
G gold extraction and F fun production. Fun decreases growth in E and G
because in fact many people do not like producing energy or mining for gold, so
as soon as there is something fun they stop work to enjoy the fun which reduces
production of E and G.
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Let us assume that t = n ∈ N and that the initial conditions are E0 =
G0 = F0 = 1. Now assume that population growth would cause growth of 10%
in each time period, but the interactions occur in the next time period. Thus
E1 = G1 = F1 = 1.1 but E2 = 1.21− .05 = 1.16 because of the fun interaction.
We have G2 = 1.21 − .05 + .05 = 1.21 and F2 = 1.21 + .05 = 1.26. We see
that the cost share CE has dropped from 1/3 to 0.32, CG is unchanged and
CF increases from 1/3 to .35, while IY (0, 2) = 1.21. Repeating the experiment
with E0 = G0/2 = F0/2 = 1/2, we obtain E1 = .55, G1 = 1.1, F1 = 1.1,
E2 = .575, G2 = 1.21, F2 = 1.26. With these initial conditions, CE decreases
from .2 to .19, CG is almost unchanged and CF increases from .40 to .41. In this
case IY (0, 2) = 1.22 so that a smaller initial cost share of the economic motor
produces greater overall growth.
Remark 2.4. Not all quantities that drag on economic growth are fun.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Secular Cycles
Turchin and Nefedov [38] empirically identified recurring secular or economic
cycles in agrarian societies. Similar phenomena apply to oil and resource pro-
duction so we recall their findings.
The cycle begins with a period of growth, in population and living standards
lasting on the order of a hundred of years. Then comes a period of stagflation in
which population density approaches the carrying capacity of the land (one says
increased population pressure) lasting on the order of half a century. During
the stagflation period peasants leave the countryside for cities, the difference
between the elite and the commoners increases, and the price of food rises rel-
ative to wages. Population ceases to grow because food production ceases to
grow. Initially the elite are somewhat better off in the stagflation period be-
cause wages are low and they can employ a larger number of former peasants
who have left the countryside. As the stagflation period progresses, the ratio
of elite population to working class population rises (the working class have a
lower birthrate and a higher mortality rate due to malnutrition and cramped
living conditions in cities) creating competition among the elite. Social mobility
increases, mostly downward as elites lose their status. The inter elite competi-
tion creates fissures which lead to civil war and the final crisis stage lasting a
few decades in which population decreases and the state breaks down. There
follows an inter-cycle lasting several decades before a new growth period ensues.
Secular cycles have been linked to unsustainable agricultural production sys-
tems [31, 10].
3.2 An Empirical Study of Oil Prices
In this section we study empirical data in order to understand what the price
dynamics of the contraction phase of oil extraction might be.
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We worked with data from BP’s 2016 Statistical Review. We used prices
and extraction data from the BP’s data set:
• Annual crude oil prices in 2015 US dollars per barrel (deflated using the
Consumer Price Index for the US) available from 1861 to 2015.
• Annual world oil production in thousand barrels (daily mean) from 1965
to 2015. These data include crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (nat-
ural gas liquids - the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered
separately). However, these data exclude liquid fuels from other sources
such as biomass and derivatives of coal and natural gas.
We used data from [36] to obtain annual world crude oil extraction in thousand
metric tons from 1937 to 1970. We used the world average conversion factor of
7.6 barrels per ton to convert this data to barrels per year.
Let (Pt)t denote the time series of oil prices (in 2015 dollars adjusted for
inflation) from year 1861 to year 2015 and (Qt)t the time series of quantities of
oil extracted (in million barrels daily) from year 1965 to year 2015 for BP data
and from 1937 to 1970 for Etemad & Luciani data from [36].
A possible first idea to study the series (Pt)t=1861...2015 may be to fit a
classical time series model to the data. As the series of prices is clearly not
stationary, one can apply a preliminary Box-Cox transformation in order to
stabilize the variance. We thus define the log-prices:
pt = logPt. (3.1)
This transformation is consistent with the assumption of log-normality of the
prices often encountered in the literature. One can try to eliminate the trend
by differentiating. The lag-1 difference operator ∇ is defined for a series (xt)t
by
∇xt def= xt − xt−1.
We are then led to study the so-called log-return at year t:
rt = ∇pt = pt − pt−1 = logPt − logPt−1. (3.2)
It is well-known that the log-returns data (∇pt)t may at first glance look like
a white noise. But, by looking closer, one would observe that the magnitude of
the fluctuations still depends on time. In fact, the series (|rt|)t and (r2t )t are
often strongly autocorrelated. Moreover, the distribution of the log-returns may
also present heavy tails. To take into account these two stylized facts, the log-
returns are often modeled by nonlinear models such as ARCH/GARCH models
or derivative models. In [35] and [37], the authors uses the daily Brent and
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil spot prices to forecast the volatility
of crude oil markets using the ARCH/GARCH model class.
The above method uses historical data to predict future oil prices through
time-series model. Many other techniques to forecast oil prices have been con-
sidered by researchers: financial models, structural models and computational
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methods using artificial neural networks, see [34] and references therein. In
structural models, oil prices are modeled as a function of explanatory variables
such as oil consumption, oil extraction and even non-oil variables such as inter-
est rates. However, the use of such models is limited by the need of future values
of the explanatory variables to derive predictions of oil prices. Furthermore, the
number of possible explanatory variables may be very large.
3.2.1 Price explained by oil extraction
The approach we consider here is structural. We try to derive information on the
price from a single explanatory time series: oil extraction. From Figure 1, one
sees that Qt cannot explain Pt because the price P is not uniquely determined
by the extracted quantity Q, in other words several prices correspond to the
same produced quantity. For this reason, we attempt to use, in addition to Qt,
the lag-1 difference and the lag-2 difference of the series (Qt)t at year t:
∇Qt def= Qt −Qt−1, (3.3)
∇2Qt def= ∇(Qt −Qt−1) = Qt − 2Qt−1 +Qt−2. (3.4)
Note that Qt, ∇Qt and ∇2Qt are linearly independent so their span is the same
as that of Qt, Qt−1 and Qt−2. We prefer the former variables to the latter
because ∇Qt and ∇2Qt are the discreet first and second derivatives of Qt with
step time h = 1 making them easier to interpret. From an economic point of
view, it is quite natural to postulate that the market for oil a given year is
influenced by production in previous years.
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Figure 1: Oil price in function of oil production from 1965 to 2015
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We consider the following model:
pt = a+ bQt + c∇Qt + d∇2Qt + t (3.5)
where a, b, c, d are coefficients determined by the linear regression and (t)t is
a centered second order stationary process. Equation (3.5) is equivalent to
Pt = exp(a+ bQt + c∇Qt + d∇2Qt + t). (3.6)
The dependency of price Pt on these variables is non-linear. As the logarithm
function flattens large values, the model takes into account the inelasticity of
oil prices. That is, small changes in the supply provoke large changes in price.
3.2.2 Data from 1965 to 2015
The R output for the linear regression with the data starting at year 1965
is given in Figure 2. First, note that we have lost two years because of the
lag-2 differences (∇2Qt)t that are only available form year 1967 with the data
set starting in 1965. Adjusted R-squared being 0.5544 means that the model
explain 55.44% of the variance from the mean taking into account the number of
explanatory variables. From the stars in the R output, we obtain four significant
coefficients for the model (3.5) that are:
a ≈ 2.055
b ≈ 0.029
c ≈ −0.204
d ≈ 0.081
Remark 3.1. We considered several other models. The regression with the 3-
lag difference ∇3Qt in addition to the other variables gave a coefficient which
was not significant. Using p˜t
def
= log(logP (t)) marginally improved the fit of
the model (with the same variables). In fact taking further logs also marginally
improved the fit. We use the above model for simplicity and because, as we will
see, the model is not robust over different time periods.
We have plotted the adjusted prices and the real prices in Figure 3. Moreover,
the model allows us to derive a prediction of the price Pt+1 at year t. Namely,
if the residuals are independent, as they are centered, the prediction of t+1 is
zero. Then, from the extracted quantity at year t + 1, we obtain at year t a
prediction of the price:
Pˆt+1 = exp
(
a+ bQt+1 + c∇Qt+1 + d∇2Qt+1
)
(3.7)
= exp (a+ bQt+1 + c (Qt+1 −Qt) + d (Qt+1 − 2Qt +Qt−1)) .
The conclusions we have made above are in fact not justified here because
the residuals of the regression are correlated. One can observe the dependence
11
Call:
lm(formula = log(Price67) ~ Quantity67 + DQuantity67 + DDQuantity67)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.91420 -0.31041 -0.03264 0.30502 1.07623
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.055439 0.362196 5.675 9.46e-07 ***
Quantity67 0.028599 0.005126 5.579 1.31e-06 ***
DQuantity67 -0.203812 0.043555 -4.679 2.65e-05 ***
DDQuantity67 0.081201 0.036108 2.249 0.0295 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.4528 on 45 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.5822, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5544
F-statistic: 20.9 on 3 and 45 DF, p-value: 1.249e-08
Figure 2: R output for linear regression (data from 1965 to 2015)
of the residuals while plotting the autocorrelation funtion and the partial auto-
correlation function with the R commands acf and pacf. One can also perform
the Box-Pierce test, the turning point test and the difference sign test with the
R commands Box.test, turning.point.test and difference.sign.test. All these tests
reject the hypothesis of a white noise at the level α = 5%. We attempt then
to fit an ARMA model to the residuals. As the partial autocorrelation at lag
1 was very high, we have chosen the AR(1) model. In fact, among the models
ARMA(p, q) with p = 0, 1, 2 and q = 0, 1, 2, the one that minimizes the AIC
and the BIC criteria is the AR(1) model. Finally, we perform a linear regression
with a covariance structure of an AR(1) with the R command gls. The model
is fitted by maximizing the log-likelihood. The R output is given in Figure 8.
The coefficients of the model (3.5) are:
a ≈ 1.591 (3.8)
b ≈ 0.032
c ≈ −0.062
d ≈ 0.018
with an AR(1)-noise (t)t such that:
t − φ t−1 = ηt
with φ estimated by 0.816 and (ηt)t an actual centered white noise with esti-
mated standard deviation 0.474. The intervals R-command allows us to obtain
12
 Pr
ic
e 
in
 U
S 
$/b
bl
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Fitted model : Simple regression (1967 − 2015)
Price
Fitted price
Figure 3: Fitted price from 1967 to 2015
95% confidence intervals for the model coefficients (see Figure 7). The plot of
price and fitted price is given in Figure 9.
We tested the stability of the coefficients by trying the regression in different
sub-intervals and found that the coefficients were not stable. This means the
model cannot be used directly to predict future prices, there is some sort of
averaging going on. One must understand why the coefficients differ in different
time frames and then analyze how future conditions might effect the coefficients.
To this end we split the data into four periods with different growth rate and
price characteristics (see Figure 4) and computed the coefficients of the classical
linear regression for each period (see Figures 5 and 6).
3.2.3 Data from 1937 to 1970
From Figure 10, one sees that for this period the price is a function of the ex-
tracted quantity. A linear regression of the log-price with explanatory variables
Qt and ∇Qt shows that the coefficient of ∇Qt is not significant in the R output
of Figure 11. The R output for the sub-model of (3.5 with c = d = 0 is given
in Figure 12. Again the residuals are not i.i.d. So we use the linear model with
covariance structure ARMA(1, 1) chosen among the ARMA(p, q) models with
p = 0, 1, 2 and q = 0, 1, 2 with the Akaike AIC criterion. The R output is given
in Figure 13. The model coefficients are
a = 2.943
b = −0.01
with an ARMA(1, 1)-noise (t)t such that :
t − φ t−1 = ηt + θ ηt−1
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Figure 4: Percent increases in quantity from 1971 to 2015
with (φ, θ) estimated by (0.04, 0.69) and (ηt)t an actual centered white noise
with estimated standard deviation 0.08. The intervals R-command allows us to
obtain 95% confidence intervals for the model coefficients (see Figure 14). The
plot of price and fitted price is given in Figure 15.
3.2.4 Interpretation of the results
It is well known that oil prices are correlated with economic growth. Indeed,
some use estimates of future GWP to obtain estimates of future oil prices. It
is not surprising then that the model (3.5) gives a reasonable fit of GWP if
one replaces pt by yt
def
= log Yt where Yt denotes GWP. We will make some
conjectures about this relationship presently.
We begin by examining what the predictive model (3.7) for the period 1967-
2015 using the coefficients (3.8).
If extraction is constant for two years then ∇Qt = ∇2Qt = 0. In that case
the model reduces to
pbasic(t) = exp(1.591 + 0.032×Qt + t) (3.9)
with 0 the expected value of t. We call this the basic price formula that
predicts the price if extraction is constant. Note that the price increases with
the quantity, consistent with a positive derivative in (2.9) as
∂Pt
∂Qt
/Pt = .032 > 0.
Suppose ∇Qt = constant 6= 0. Then ∇2Qt = 0 and the model becomes
p(t) = exp(1.591 + 0.032×Qt − 0.062×∇Qt). (3.10)
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Note that the coefficient of ∇Qt is about twice as large as the coefficient of
Qt and of opposite sign. Thus ∇Qt gives a larger price signal than Qt. The
signal goes in the opposite direction of the change but it only lasts for a year.
One might understand this as follows: a rise (fall) in extraction causes growth
(contraction) in the economy much more next year than this year (as in the
example in Section 2.5).
Example 3.1. If extraction is constant at 88 mbd, the basic price is Pˆbasic(t) ≈
$82/barrel. If Qt = 88, Qt−1 = 86, and Qt−2 = 84 then ∇Qt = ∇Qt−1 = 2 and
∇2Qt = 0. Then Pˆt ≈ $72/barrel less than the basic price because extraction is
rising. If Qt−1 = 90 and Qt−2 = 92, then ∇Qt = ∇Qt−1 = −2 and ∇2Qt = 0.
Then Pˆ (t) ≈ $93/barrel greater than the basic price because extraction is falling.
The second derivative is negative at local maximuma and positive at local
minimuma so that the second derivative will mollify the price change caused by
the first derivative. This explains why peak extraction is frequently associated
with low prices. A minimum in extraction will thus be associated with relatively
high prices. Economically this factor can be interpreted as follows: it takes two
years for the economic growth (contraction) produced by an increase (decrease)
in extraction to take hold. The first year it is rather fragile and easily reduced
(increased) by a drop (rise) in extraction.
Example 3.2. 1. If Qt = 88, Qt−1 = 86, and Qt−2 = 88, then extraction
reaches a local minimum at Qt−1. We compute Pˆ (t) ≈ $78 rather than
$72 as in Example 3.1 with the same increase in extraction from 86 mbd.
2. If Qt = 88, Qt−1 = 90, and Qt−2 = 88, then extraction reaches a lo-
cal maximum at Qt−1. We compute Pˆ (t) ≈ $86 rather than $93 as in
Example 3.1 with the same decrease in extraction from 90 mbd.
3. It is interesting to note that if Qt = q0ρ
t with ρ = (1 + r) and the growth
rate r in a reasonable range (0 < r < .12) then pˆ(t) is an increasing
function of t. For example if Qt = 80(1.02)
t, then pˆ(3) ≈ $58.3 <
$60.8 ≈ pˆ(4), thus increasing extraction at a constant rate produces in-
creasing prices. However pˆ(4) is much lower than the basic price at the
same extraction quantity which is $87.6.
We believe that the differences in the different periods we studied stem from
the importance of oil in the economy, that is the size of the partial derivative
of economic production with respect to oil varied during the different periods.
From 1937 to 1970, oil extraction increased regularly and so was never an imped-
iment to economic growth. In the 1970’s, oil shocks created irregular supplies
and constraints in oil supplies reduced economic growth. Mathematically this is
expressed by a larger partial derivative of economic production with respect to
oil extraction levels. this period, as in the period from 2005 to 2014. This leads
us to the following conjectures in accord with (2.8) and our empirical results:
Conjecture 3.1. The principle signal of scarcity of oil production is that
∂p
∂q
>
0.
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Conjecture 3.2. Volatility in the supply of oil leads to increased price depen-
dence on the discreet first and second derivatives of supply.
The standard scarcity rent view, that lower quantities leads to higher prices
can be explained by temporary dependence on the first and second discreet
derivatives of extraction levels. After the short term spikes, the price stabilizes
with economic production adjusting to the new level of extraction. In other
words, a shortage of important items in economic production ultimately leads
to lower prices because economic production contracts reducing demand. This
can be read from Equation (2.6).
In [1], the authors note that
∂p
∂q
> 0 is unstable. When extraction levels
are increasing,
∂p
∂q
> 0 encourages many actors to enter the extraction business
which commonly leads to sharp increases in extraction levels and a price col-
lapse. This occurred in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s and again from 2000
to 2013 when capital expenses increased at roughly 11% per year [17, 26]. If
extraction levels are decreasing then
∂p
∂q
> 0 leads to bankruptcies of higher
priced extractors which leads to sharply decreasing extraction levels.
4 Scenarios
The success of our analysis using the dynamic production function identities
should be judged by its ability to predict the dynamics of future scenarios.
Throughout this section we make the following hypothesis:
(H4) For most of the contraction phase of oil extraction,
∂Y
∂qi
> 0 and is rela-
tively large.
Hypothesis (H4) and (2.8) give us the following bound on price increases:
Ip˜i(t1, t2) < IC˜i(t1, t2)/Iqi(t1, t2) (4.1)
4.1 Cost Share Dynamics.
In the case of a sharp unexpected change in extraction levels, that is in the
case of oil shocks or gluts, one can approximate Ip˜i(t1, t2) and IC˜i(t1, t2) with
Ipi(t1, t2) and ICi(t1, t2) respectively. These measures can then be used with
IQ(t1, t2) to estimate the effect of an oil shock or glut on the economy.
Observe that consumers choices influence cost share. For example in the
1940’s, people routinely heated to 14 degrees C. Suppose lower prices and/or
technology reduce the amount of money relative to a salary to heat to 14 de-
grees. The consumer can decide to either use her disposable income to purchase
other items, or heat to 16 degrees C. Likewise when the price of fuel is high,
consumers tend to buy more fuel efficient vehicles than when the price is low.
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For fundamental quantities such as oil, we thus expect that in a growing econ-
omy IC˜i > IC˜mini
, where ItildeCmini is the minimum possible cost share. In a
shrinking economy we expect that IC˜i will be very close to I
min
tildeCi
. Moreover
in a contracting economy, substitutes may be found for oil so that ICi < IC˜i .
From (2.6), we have, for any times t1 and t2,
Ip˜i(t1, t2) = IYi(t1, t2)IC˜i(t1, t2)/Iqi(t1, t2). (4.2)
It is clear from (4.2) that during the expansion phase oil production economic
growth and consumer choices will support oil prices while during the contraction
phase, economic contraction and consumer choices will tend to decrease prices.
We believe (4.2) can be used to measure and calibrate Jevons paradox which
will not support prices as much in a shrinking economy.
In the preceding argument, the cost share we speak of is not exactly Ci. It
is the cost share in consumer budgets. Because a standard effect of stagflation
is to reduce wages, consumers with lower wages will be more sensitive to higher
prices and change their preferences accordingly.
Rising cost share of energy is not benign. It means a loss of diversity in the
economy. It means less money for some non core jobs in the economy which
leads to lower wages and fewer opportunities in these areas. This is a principle
aspect of stagflation. The cost share of food and energy rises in family budgets
and less money can be devoted to other areas of the economy.
From (2.9), we see that
∂qi
∂pi
< 0 (which implies
∂pi
∂qi
< 0) causes a drag on
the economy. One can interpret this fact as follows: lower prices send a signal to
suppliers that supplies should fall, higher prices send the opposite signal. Thus
if the suppliers ignore market signals, this causes the economy to contract. The
drag can be compensated if
∂Ci
∂pi
< 0 or at least small. In other words, if
∂qi
∂pi
< 0, and 1/pi is small, then in order for
∂Y
∂pi
to be positive, qi must cause
growth in other sectors of the economy. The more efficiently oil is used, the
greater the growth of other sectors of the economy.
4.2 Current analysis
Using the vocabulary of Turchin and Nefedov, we put the growth phase of oil
extraction from 1865 to 1973. Before 1973, there was strong regular growth in
extraction volumes. We then enter a period of volatility in extraction volumes
characterized by the price shocks of the 1970’s. Although there was a strong
political component to the price shocks in the 1970’s [19], the period gives
valuable lessons on how prices behave when oil supplies are constrained. We
begin to see signs of stagflation with respect to oil extraction in the late 1970’s:
stagnant wages and increased difference between the elites and the working class
[27]. Of course the modern economy of the 20th and 21st centuries is much more
stratified than that of the agrarian societies studied by Turchin and Nefedov
with several classes of workers (blue collar, white collar, etc.) and some classes
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of workers (white collar) at least initially belong to what can be considered an
elite class.
If one considers the oil extracting firms to be a class of elites, one sees inter-
elite competition intensifying in two distinct periods. We speak of the price
wars of the late 1980’s and beginning in late 2014 to the present.
The reasons for decreased pressure on oil prices in the 1990’s should be the
subject of future research. Perhaps economic growth during that period was
driven by the high technology sector less reliant on oil. Perhaps efficiency gains
attained during the period of high prices took pressure off of prices. Perhaps
stagnant wages reduced demand of the working class.
It is highly probable that the current low price environment (relative to
extraction costs) signals the beginning of the contraction phase of oil extraction.
4.3 Analysis of common scenarios
4.3.1 The magic market.
A common scenario is that the contraction phase of oil extraction will cause
shortages of oil which will cause prices to increase and the market will find a
solution. This scenario contradicts Conjecture 3.1 and implies great efficiency
gains will be needed to keep the economy from contracting.
This scenario does not fit with the empirical evidence presented in [25] in
which scarcity of essential items is associated with extremely short term thinking
and poor general performance.
Empirically we see that current markets are dysfunctional. The current low
price environment is attracting record amounts of capital to produce oil at a
loss [30, 8]. The market is ignoring price signals which we have noted is a drag
on the economy. Furthermore consumers in the U.S. are purchasing inefficient
vehicles unaware that many analysts are expecting oil extraction levels to fall.
The (non OPEC) oil extraction industry has accumulated a large amount of
debt [21] in the last 5 years which will make it difficult to invest in new projects
even if prices rise significantly.
For these reasons we find this scenario improbable.
4.3.2 The undulating plateau (prolonged stagflation).
The IEA in their World Energy Outlook frequently refers to an undulating
plateau in oil extraction lasting several decades to about 2050. This scenario
implies roughly constant extraction levels and increasing prices because extrac-
tion costs are increasing. Thus
∂qi
∂pi
is close to 0. This means that |∂pi
∂qi
| is
large so that there will be high price volatility. Moreover the economy will lose
diversity because in general
∂Ci
∂pi
> 0. We believe that the loss of diversity
translates into lower wages and increased efficiency in the use of oil to combat
rising cost share. These two forces, along with a stagnating economy contribute
to downward pressure on prices (see (4.2)). The undulating plateau would thus
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end when the market price for oil falls below the cost of extraction. Indeed, this
description fits the 2005 to 2014 period, and the current low price of oil seems
to be the signal that the contraction phase has begun.
4.3.3 The rule of Hotelling.
The rule of Hotelling predicts that the price of oil increases exponentially irre-
spective of the quantity produced. This implies that in the contractive stage
of oil extraction,
∂pi
∂qi
<< 0. To satisfy (H4),
∂Ci
∂qi
< 0. This implies efficiency
must grow dramatically. Since efficiency is a bounded quantity, this will not be
sustainable.
4.4 Probable scenarios
The oil extraction industry is cyclical with periods of high prices spurring in-
vestment followed by periods of low prices in which investment falls. Much oil
extraction is not profitable at current prices [20, 7].
According to Rystad Energy oil extraction will decline slightly from 2016 to
2020 [16]. We believe that efficiency gains should make this decrease bearable.
After 2020, we anticipate that non-OPEC oil extraction will fall more rapidly
because of the cuts in capital expenses that have taken place in the last two years
and accumulated debt of the oil extraction industry [21]. This will cause tension
between the extraction industry and the financial sector as they grapple with
ways to pay off debt and maintain extraction levels (inter-elite competition). In
any case whether it is investors or extractors, this will cause increased social
mobility, mostly downward which will put downward pressure on oil prices.
Eventually extraction rates will fall fast enough to raise prices at least tem-
porarily, as suggested by the empirical model (3.6), until companies and citizens
go bankrupt and demand decreases. We anticipate improved efficiency in oil use
will be used to reduce cost share, there will not be a corresponding price re-
bound.
A Seneca cliff [6] can be imagined if for example a precipitous drop in non
OPEC (after 2020) extraction coincides with conflict in the Persian Gulf simul-
taneously reducing OPEC extraction rates. If extraction rates fall precipitously
and remain low for two years, one can expect a price spike followed by a drop in
prices which decimates first industries which use oil followed by the oil extraction
industry and a recovery will be highly unlikely.
Note that both theoretical considerations from the dynamic production func-
tion identities and the empirical model (3.6) indicate that price dynamics will
speed the rate of decline in oil extraction. During the growth phase of oil extrac-
tion, low prices increased demand and high prices increase supply, during the
contraction phase, low prices will diminish supply and high prices will diminish
demand.
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5 Conclusion
Our analysis and empirical evidence are consistent with oil being a fundamental
quantity in economic production. Our analysis indicates that once the contrac-
tion period for oil extraction begins, price dynamics will accelerate the decline
in extraction rates: extraction rates decline because of a decrease in profitability
of the extraction business.
Our empirical model for prices can be used by those studying future extrac-
tion rates whose models currently do not consider price parameters.
We believe that the contraction period in oil extraction has begun and that
policy makers should be making contingency plans. Strategies for economies
facing energy constraints are reviewed in [31].
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Figure 5: Adjusted price and linear regression coefficients for the first two peri-
ods
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Figure 6: Adjusted price and linear regression coefficients for the last two periods
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Approximate 95% confidence intervals
Coefficients:
lower est. upper
(Intercept) 0.022397944 1.59149406 3.16059019
Quantity67 0.009351441 0.03233695 0.05532245
DQuantity67 -0.136791534 -0.06161179 0.01356795
DDQuantity67 -0.026275104 0.01760809 0.06149129
attr(,"label")
[1] "Coefficients:"
Correlation structure:
lower est. upper
Phi 0.5850527 0.8157226 0.9242878
attr(,"label")
[1] "Correlation structure:"
Residual standard error:
lower est. upper
0.3095668 0.4745731 0.7275315
Figure 7: Confidence intervals for generalized linear model
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Generalized least squares fit by maximum likelihood
Model: log(Price67) ~ Quantity67 + DQuantity67 + DDQuantity67
Data: NULL
AIC BIC logLik
25.46087 36.8118 -6.730437
Correlation Structure: AR(1)
Formula: ~1
Parameter estimate(s):
Phi
0.8157226
Coefficients:
Value Std.Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 1.5914941 0.7790544 2.0428536 0.0470
Quantity67 0.0323369 0.0114123 2.8335228 0.0069
DQuantity67 -0.0616118 0.0373267 -1.6506111 0.1058
DDQuantity67 0.0176081 0.0217880 0.8081572 0.4233
Correlation:
(Intr) Qntt67 DQnt67
Quantity67 -0.963
DQuantity67 0.181 -0.253
DDQuantity67 -0.076 0.134 -0.836
Standardized residuals:
Min Q1 Med Q3 Max
-2.00263835 -0.78485751 -0.06177291 0.89327110 2.19086672
Residual standard error: 0.4745731
Degrees of freedom: 49 total; 45 residual
Figure 8: R output for generalized linear model
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Call:
lm(formula = log(Price38) ~ Quantity38 + DQuantity38)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.242481 -0.029444 -0.004043 0.049495 0.158822
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.932949 0.030064 97.557 < 2e-16 ***
Quantity38 -0.010851 0.003625 -2.994 0.00548 **
DQuantity38 0.005838 0.039986 0.146 0.88489
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.08699 on 30 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6866, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6657
F-statistic: 32.86 on 2 and 30 DF, p-value: 2.767e-08
Figure 11: R output for linear regression with Q and ∇Q
Call:
lm(formula = log(Price37) ~ Quantity37)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.247301 -0.027531 -0.003024 0.045956 0.155702
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.938555 0.026636 110.323 < 2e-16 ***
Quantity37 -0.010602 0.001242 -8.536 9.38e-10 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.08592 on 32 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6948, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6853
F-statistic: 72.86 on 1 and 32 DF, p-value: 9.375e-10
Figure 12: R output for linear regression with Q
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Generalized least squares fit by maximum likelihood
Model: log(Price37) ~ Quantity37
Data: NULL
AIC BIC logLik
-76.68285 -69.05105 43.34143
Correlation Structure: ARMA(1,1)
Formula: ~1
Parameter estimate(s):
Phi1 Theta1
0.04192361 0.68672117
Coefficients:
Value Std.Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 2.9432219 0.03648706 80.66482 0
Quantity37 -0.0108237 0.00166328 -6.50744 0
Correlation:
(Intr)
Quantity37 -0.826
Standardized residuals:
Min Q1 Med Q3 Max
-3.02031726 -0.35963721 -0.02228464 0.53613448 1.84587136
Residual standard error: 0.08285304
Degrees of freedom: 34 total; 32 residual
Figure 13: R output for generalized linear regression with Q from 1937 to 1970
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Approximate 95% confidence intervals
Coefficients:
lower est. upper
(Intercept) 2.86890018 2.94322188 3.017543581
Quantity37 -0.01421165 -0.01082367 -0.007435683
attr(,"label")
[1] "Coefficients:"
Correlation structure:
lower est. upper
Phi1 -0.3509428 0.04192361 0.4222400
Theta1 0.3357870 0.68672117 0.8702507
attr(,"label")
[1] "Correlation structure:"
Residual standard error:
lower est. upper
0.06233411 0.08285304 0.11012631
Figure 14: R output confidence intervals for generalized linear regression with
Q from 1937 to 1970
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Fitted model : Generalized linear model (1937 − 1970)
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Fitted price
Figure 15: Fitted price from 1937 to 1970
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